Scope for Intersection Between Antitrust Laws and Corporate Governance Principles Vis-À-Vis Cartels Deterrence in India

Scope for Intersection Between Antitrust Laws and Corporate Governance Principles Vis-À-Vis Cartels Deterrence in India

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Volume 9 Issue 1-2 ()

Competition law and corporate governance seem to analyse the external and internal operations of a firm respectively. This paper seeks to explore the scope for meaningful interaction between the two with respect to cartels. We believe that understanding the issue of cartel from the context of shareholder interest as an agency problem can help shape antitrust policy regarding the same. First, we propose a ‘carrot and stick’ approach to overhaul the antitrust policy. This involves imposing threat of individual liability through administrative sanctions and improving the predictability of the current antitrust leniency policy. Second, we argue for a shift in approach of CCI in viewing cartels as an agency problem linked to the corporate culture of the rm. Thus, we argue that CCI needs to draw on international experience and incentivise firms to adopt an antitrust compliance policy by promising reduced penalties for companies that implement effective antitrust compliance policy. CCI may also encourage companies to complement the antitrust compliance policy with an internal leniency policy protecting confessors from adverse work related consequences and proving antitrust leniency. Therefore, we believe that an understanding of cartels from corporate governance angle can steer antitrust policy on the track to effective deterrence.

Cite as: Sahithya Muralidharan and Chaitanya Deshpande, Scope for Intersection Between Antitrust Laws and Corporate Governance Principles Vis-À-Vis Cartels Deterrence in India, 9 NUJS L. Rev. 93 (2016)

Disclaimer: All articles of Issue 9 (1-2) of the NUJS Law Review will be released online once the print copy is out