Year: 2016

In the plethora of legal writing available, judgments rendered by courts as well as articles written by law professors and students occupy a crucial position. However, the writing in both these branches of legal scholarship is riddled with certain flaws which have the deleterious effect of lowering the overall quality of legal scholarship. We intend to shed light on these systemic defects. Addressing the defects would be beneficial for litigants, lawyers, judges, law students, law professors, organizations and the general public. In Part II, we discuss legal judgment writing by judges as a subset of legal scholarship, and underline the importance of making judgments precise, reasoned and comprehensive. In Part III we scrutinise legal pedagogy in law schools, and the reasons behind the lack of meaningful engagement with empirical exploration in the works of law professors and students in the course of their research. In Part IV we draw some conclusions…

Through the field of interdisciplinary studies, scholars have attempted to identify a nexus between the law and other areas of research. This is largely an endeavour which seeks to tangibly connect different aspects of human life and society to that which governs them – the law. This has been exemplified by the rise of ‘law ands’, which in turn has significantly contributed to the manner in which legal research and academia is conducted. This interdisciplinary approach has extended to interpreting the law and legal institutions in light of the most unlikely of themes; this being evidenced by ‘legal history’, ‘law and economics’, ‘film and law’ and the subject of this note, ‘law and literature’. This growing interest in ‘law and’ is premised on the notion that “the legal world is not to be understood on its own terms, but requires the application of some method or substance provided by other disciplines”.1 However, this is distinct from the notion that law, in combination with another discipline, may form the basis for a new discipline altogether. The very basis of interdisciplinary approaches to law rests on the ability of each separate discipline to effectively contribute to the other in academic as well as non-academic circles…

Friends,
On the occasion of your Annual Convocation, I felt that instead of giving you a scholarly lecture on a legal topic, it would be more appropriate to give you a bit of information, some of which you may already have, that may help you in making a decision in pursuing in law…

Since its establishment in 2000, this institution has emerged as a prominent centre of legal education. The graduates from this institution have indeed made a very bright start to their careers. The wider socio-economic changes that have been taking place since the beginning of the economic liberalization in our country have created many promising career avenues for young lawyers. The choices range from mainstream litigation to opening s in commercial law firms and companies in addition to careers in academics and the public services. This is, of course, a testament to the first rate training that is being imparted in the National Law Universities…

Property is a contingent fact within our world. It is neither ordained by nature nor is necessary for human survival. So the development of virtual worlds gives us an excellent opportunity to experiment with the legal relationships, transactions, and obligations that, in the real world, fall within the category of property. Virtual worlds are places where millions of people come to play, trade, create, and socialize. In this Article, the author examines the most debated legal question raised by virtual world societies. The author makes a modest attempt to explain whether virtual objects might be understood as constituting legal property by taking the Hegelian theory of Intellectual Property as the base of her argument, as according to Hegel, intellectual property need not be justified by analogy to physical property. In fact, the analogy to physical property may distort the very status Hegel ascribes to personality and mental traits in relation to the will. Property is a contingent fact within our world. It is neither ordained by nature nor is necessary for human survival. So the development of virtual worlds gives us an excellent opportunity to experiment with the legal relationships, transactions, and obligations that, in the real world, fall within the category of property. Virtual worlds are places where millions of people come to play, trade, create, and socialize. In this Article, the author examines the most debated legal question raised by virtual world societies. The author makes a modest attempt to explain whether virtual objects might be understood as constituting legal property by taking the Hegelian theory of Intellectual Property as the base of her argument, as according to Hegel, intellectual property need not be justified by analogy to physical property. In fact, the analogy to physical property may distort the very status Hegel ascribes to personality and mental traits in relation to the will.

Human rights are the basic rights and freedoms to which all humans
are entitled. The concept of human rights has existed under several names in
European thought for many centuries, though perhaps coming into prominence
since the time of King John of England. After the king violated a number of
ancient laws and customs by which England had been governed, there was a
popular upheaval and his subjects forced him to sign the Magna Carta, or Great
Charter, which enumerates a number of rights of the people, which later came to be
termed as human rights…

The principle that a person should be presumed innocent until proven guilty is a fundamental principle of procedural fairness in criminal law. Its justifications lie in the socio-legal consequences of convicting an individual for the commission of a crime. This principle acts as a protection against erroneous convictions and ensures that an accused is not oppressed by the immense power and resources of the State. The opposite rule – a presumption of guilt – imposes an unfair burden on the accused that requires him to prove his innocence, failing which he is convicted. Such a burden is envisaged by reverse onus clauses or reverse burdens, which supplant the hallowed presumption of innocence with the grossly unjust presumption of guilt. This paper argues that reverse onus clauses are both unconstitutional and a glaring contravention of a sacred principle of criminal law.

Recent events suggest that the near-automatic consequence of being a dominant firm in a profitable market is abuse of that position by resorting to the imposition of unfair terms and conditions in standard contracts. Ostensibly, this may seem to be a consumer law problem due to the ‘unfairness’ of the conditions involved but such practices also have an impact on competition in the market, which justifies antitrust scrutiny too. The forum to which the matter is taken influences the relief. This paper analyses the interface between competition law and consumer law in the theoretical framework and through the non-uniform understanding of ‘consumer welfare’ that informs both. This framework outlines the nature of such cases and reinforces the idea that a consumer law problem can be problematic for competition in the market too. Through the case study of Belaire Owners Association v. DLF, this paper seeks to identify the most appropriate regulatory tool between the two laws that would sufficiently regulate such market failures. It concludes that though both competition law scrutiny and consumer law intervention are justified, the question is with respect to their sufficiency. In this context, an analysis of the source of such market failure helps in identifying the correct remedy, which this paper argues, is consumer law.

Gambling and wagers have always enthralled people ever since the beginning of civilisation. Instances of gambling can be found in the Mahabharata, Quran and other religious texts. The law and the judiciary, in modern times, have looked at card games as a pernicious and immoral activity. In the last two centuries, sophisticated card games involving a great degree of skill and intellect have become highly popular among the masses. The laws regulating and prohibiting gambling, however, remain ambiguous and archaic. This paper analyses the laws prohibiting gambling in India and discusses the legality of card games involving a substantial degree of skill in the light of international discourse and analysis about the game of poker.

The fate of the Naz Foundation decision, until the Supreme Court decides on the appeal before it, rests upon the territorial applicability of the Delhi High Court judgment. This paper argues that at present the question of territorial application of a High Court judgment is unsettled as the existing precedent of the Kusum Ingots case is not decisive on the point. The paper evaluates the merits and demerits of various solutions, such as reintroduction of hitherto repealed Articles 131A and226A of the Constitution, or intervention by the legislature or the judiciary. The key problems with adopting solutions suggested hitherto would be the possibility of failure on part of the Supreme Court or the legislature to notice a situation where a disparity in the law exists in different states, increased delay in deciding an issue in case of an extra reference being made to the Supreme Court or the legislature for intervention, loss of a stage of appeal or possibly stripping the High Courts of jurisdiction to enforce Fundamental Rights when constitutionality of a Central legislation is in issue. The paper then suggests an interesting solution whereby High Courts, after granting interim relief where necessary, shall submit constitutional questions to Regional Benches of the Supreme Court for decision on the limited issue of constitutionality, and that the problem of delay caused by shuttling between the high court and the Supreme Court would be offset by the benefit of uniformity in the law.