The sanctity and credibility of the democratic legal system is intrinsically linked to the enforceability of rights, a task typically adjudged to the judiciary. However, the constitutional court’s image as the defender of rights has come into scrutiny due to its incapability of ensuring government compliance, especially in cases requiring enforcement of positive state duties. Socio-economic rights, for instance, propose a major challenge to the judicial and legal system where coercing state action is at times an insurmountable task. The Indian Supreme Court, tip-toeing around the constitutional separation of powers, has devised the novel writ remedy of ‘continuing mandamus’ to prevent the failure of constitutional promises. Instead of passing a final judgement that would end the litigation, it keeps the case pending, entering into a dialogue with the political and administrative wing, prodding to alter government action, or inaction. This paper discusses the Supreme Court’s procedural innovation in the backdrop of the enforcement conundrum. Locating the need for the remedy in constitutional and rights theory, the paper traces judicial trends, and extensively reviews the use of the remedy by the Indian Supreme Court over the years. The authors assess the effectiveness of how the remedy is being administered, identifying reasons for the success of some interventions, vis-à-vis others, trying to locate the shortcomings and roadblocks to the court’s approach.