The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, (‘AA’) was designed to settle disputes out of courts for quicker results. Logically extended, the judicial oversight of those must also be governed by the similar objective of a quick pace. With the introduction of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, (‘CCA’) and its application to arbitral appeals, added speed should have been the easily-inferred objective. However, the provision in the AA for creating the right to appeals, namely, §37, has been bestowed with an interpretation that sedates pace. The provision does not speak about the most crucial aspect of a fast-paced dispute resolution, i.e. limitation. This paper highlights that the judiciary reads this silence as importing both a limitation period and a licence to condone delays against it from the prevailing general law. As just and equitable as it may seem, importing the latter runs counter to the prevailing law. The CCA has provided a hard cap for limitations, with no mention of condonation. While ‘no condonation’ is doubly suggested by the speedy intent of both the legislations alone, there exist more jurisprudential trends compelling this approach. The Limitation Act, 1963, (‘LA’) is a general law, which applies its exemptions only if they are invited or if promptitude is not the primary factor governing the special law. Neither is the case with the CCA. This legislation is territorially aggressive and is quick to shut out general laws from applying to its disputes. Moreover, the AA has generally pointed, site by site, where it behaves as a general law itself. This is wherever it cedes its procedural governance to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. At those sites, it then behaves like a general law unhesitatingly inviting another of its kind, and where a more wholesome application of the LA made sense. §37 is not one such site. This paper, therefore, argues that reading the availability of condonation for commercial-arbitral appeals is unjustified by every available legal metric.