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“Can jus cogens be defined?” “What are the elements upon which it rests?” “Can it bind a State without its will?” The scholarship on jus cogens poses more questions about jus cogens than it answers. There is also less agreement within the international law academe on what jus cogens is than on what is ‘not’. ‘Not’ considering a universal ethical norm as jus cogens stems from the positivist nature of mainstream international law and its statist claims. International law discourse is well-guarded by positivism, where law is projected as amoral and detached from any meta-legal components, thereby deflecting any possibility of conceding spaces to naturalism. Jus cogens, as the embodiment of minimum ethical norms, marked by its supremacy in the normative hierarchy, its abstractness, fluidity, and other natural law characteristics, is seen as non-conformist in this positivist schema. However, the moral and ethical weight of jus cogens compels it to be ‘accepted’ as an international law norm, but with certain concessions. This paper is shaped by the following concessions — in the natural law characteristics, its embodiment in positivist law (including the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the 2022 Draft conclusions on identification of peremptory norms), and its treatment in the decisions of the International Court of Justice — and the continued intransigence of positivist mainstream international law to jus cogens. Adopting a decolonial lens, the paper recounts the pruning and sanitising of the naturalism of jus cogens by positivism at the site of the court.

This article challenges the linear, progressivist temporalities that dominate international legal thought by engaging with eighteenth-century Senegambia as a distinct material and temporal site. It explores how the lifeworlds of gender-nonconforming Mande griots (jeliw), embedded within insurrectionary West African conceptions of time and personhood, disrupt the normative assumptions of international law’s historical narratives. Drawing on Black radical, decolonial queer and trans/feminist traditions, the article examines how colonial legal formations not only supported a burgeoning circum-Atlantic economy of enslavement, but also imposed violent reckonings of time and subjectivity. In tracing the geontologically plural ‘proto-colonial’ Senegambian temporalities, the article foregrounds ways of being that resist the extractivist linear logics of international law. Against the enduring imperial intimacies and technologies of subjectivation that continue to shape international law’s reckonings with time and meaning, the article asks what the stories and ways of being-in-the-world that emerge from the temporal otherwise might reveal about connections foreclosed by colonial violence — connections that could have been, were lost, and are thus not yet.

The use of the terms artificial and intelligence, in that order, is practically ubiquitous in the legalese of the 2020s. Though one may not fully understand its functioning or implications, a discussion about AI and its effects remains necessary. The legal field, including advocacy, has seen an aggressive push towards incorporating ‘AI tools’ to improve the efficiency and quality of services it can offer. This includes the sphere of arbitration within this legal field. The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, through its 2025 Guidelines on the Use of AI in Arbitration, highlighted possible risks that may exist when AI tools are used in the arbitral process. These risks exist when tools are used by the arbitrators and the counsels representing the parties in the process. In the authors’ understanding, these risks may cause issues in the enforceability of the award arising from this ‘AI-influenced’ arbitration. The authors believe the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is not yet prepared to deal with these risks. Accordingly, this paper explores, through tangible examples, the issues that can arise when one tries to enforce an ‘AI-influenced’ arbitral award in India, due to the risks posed by the usage of AI in arbitration. It hopes to initiate conversations on this front to future-proof arbitration in India.

India is a country that often prides itself on its social, religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity, being home to thousands of such identity groups. However, the treatment meted out to certain groups, both formally and informally, often fails to conform to the principles of equality, liberty, and secularism. The systematic discrimination against Muslims in particular has led to their ghettoisation in states such as Gujarat. This ghettoisation has been formalised through laws such as the Gujarat Prohibition of Transfer of Immovable Property and Provision for Protection of Tenants from Eviction from Premises in Disturbed Areas Act, 1991 (‘Disturbed Areas Act’). To that end, this paper explores the background of the Act and amendments to the same, particularly in 2020. It goes on to test provisions of the Disturbed Areas Act against Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution and shows their unconstitutionality . Further, it explores the national impact of the Gujarat High Court’s stay of certain provisions and how striking down the provisions is preferred in the present case. The Paper will also undertake a cross-jurisdictional analysis, examining the systems of ethnocratic planning and segregation perpetuated in countries such as South Africa, Israel, and the United States of America, and the Constitutional safeguards (or lack thereof). Lastly, the Paper will address the suggestions of various national and international reports, the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing in 2017, the Sachar Committee Report, and the Expert Group on Equal Opportunity Commission.

In the recent past, significant concerns have been raised over the increasing institutional opacity in India’s electoral framework. The December 2024 amendment to the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, which restricts public inspection of non-specified documents, is a worrying development. This Note argues that the amendment curtails right to information, a crucial component of Article 19(1)(a), integral for legitimate democratic governance and accountability. The Note also argues that the pre-amended Rule 93(2)(a) hitherto served an important function of ‘architectural regulation’ — a mechanism enabling citizens to act as guardians to ensure deterrence against malpractice. By undoing this pre-emptive check, the State reverts to the onerous, adversarial litigation route, which undermines the spirit of informational equity that weakens India’s accountability architecture.

Free and fair elections have always been considered to be the cornerstone of Indian democracy. However, free and fair processes can be incorporated only if elections are conducted in the first place. This paper deals with the unique and pressing issue of delayed elections for local self-governmental bodies. The Supreme Court of India has, in several cases, struck down state legislations that extended the tenures of local self-governing bodies (such as panchayats, parishads, and samitis). They were held to be in violation of the mandatory time limits provided by the Indian Constitution. Through this paper, the authors seek to showcase the blatant non-adherence and flagrant violation of these judgments and highlight the constitutional issues which arise from them. First, since elections are not being held, it allows the incumbents to be in power for a longer time than constitutionally stipulated. This indicates a semblance of a tyrannical regime since such a monopoly cannot be kept in check with the existing democratic safeguards. Second, the independence of the State Election Commission is challenged since it is due to their failure and incompetence that this problem originally arose. Third, an investigation into the public finances held by these incumbents highlights a usurpation and misuse of public funds during their ‘temporary’ posts. These judgments have merely ordered the States to conduct the elections in these states, without examining these intricate foundational obstructions, leaving a constitutional hiatus between legal adjudication and practical reality. Through this paper, the authors aim to conduct a thorough and intricate investigation to explore this prevalent vacuum, which has neither been judicially addressed nor legislatively explored. While the States have argued that the continuous delay of elections for the local self-government bodies is due to judicially imposed administrative formalities, this paper aims to discern reasons to the contrary.

In an age where the right to privacy and freedom of speech are frequently at odds, the omission of a journalistic exemption in India’s Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, (‘DPDPA’ or ‘the Act’) creates a critical gap in reconciling these fundamental rights. While global data protection frameworks recognise the need for journalistic exemptions to balance privacy with public interest, the DPDPA departs from this norm, raising concerns about its potential impact on both professional and citizen-led journalism. This article examines how the DPDPA constrains journalistic freedom through its stringent consent requirements and data-use limitations, compounded by potential governmental overreach. Drawing on constitutional principles under Article 19(1)(a), it argues that the absence of a journalistic exemption undermines both journalists’ rights and the public’s access to essential information. To address this, the article proposes a recommended draft provision for a journalistic exemption that aligns with global best practices and seeks to find the appropriate balance between considerations of data protection, public interest and journalistic freedom.

In India, trust disputes are considered wholly non-arbitrable. The Supreme Court conclusively established this in Shri Vimal Kishor Shah & Ors. v. Jayesh Dinesh Shah & Ors., and since then, there has been little discussion on the subject. Recently, however, an English High Court, by its decision in Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, rekindled a worldwide discussion on the arbitrability of trust disputes. It held such disputes to be arbitrable despite the arbitrator’s inability to grant relief for each claim. This motivates a relook at the Indian position, given our tendency to trail English arbitration jurisprudence. As a policy measure, arbitration could possibly cater to the specific demands of trusts and ensure a more efficient resolution of disputes. This position, however, is not legally intuitive. The equitable origins of trusts place civil courts in a unique supervisory position, burdened with protecting a trust’s functioning. This may inherently be at odds with the private nature of the arbitration. Nevertheless, other jurisdictions have managed to reconcile these innate differences to allow trustees, beneficiaries and settlors of trusts to enjoy the benefits of arbitration. This paper seeks to argue that such models permitting the arbitration of trust disputes should be adopted for India, too. In doing so, it also suggests a framework around which to construct this Indian model.

India’s delimitation and seat reapportionment process has been frozen for the Lok Sabha and state legislative assemblies since 2008, which was conducted based on the 2001 census. In the meantime, population growth and migration have substantially altered the demographics of various regions and constituencies, materially affecting the equality of voting power enshrined by the Indian Constitution. Several scholarly articles have already highlighted the malapportionment issue in India, but an examination of this problem from an individual voter’s rights perspective has been lacking. Using a data-driven approach to establish the derogation of the ‘One Person, One Vote’ principle in India, we examine the constitutional sanction of equal suffrage and whether a departure from the same is permissible. Delimitation freezes, whether legally sanctioned or arising through mere executive inaction, do not pass a fundamental rights scrutiny under Article 14 and thus may not be permissible as a policy. While there is significant merit to the assertion that executive discretion should not be unduly fettered in this regard, this prerogative cannot extend to the subordination of citizens’ rights to political exigencies. Such a situation must be redressed to maintain the constitutional vision of democracy. We find that the established judicial precedent, both in domestic and foreign jurisdictions, aligns in favour of judicial intervention for the protection of effective voting rights from passive malapportionment. Pdf

Inter-country adoption remains one of the most complicated terrains in the realm of private international law. While inter-country adoption is not preferred over domestic adoption, socially and legally, its significance cannot be overlooked.  This paper examines the various obstacles surrounding inter-country adoption that hinder its effective utilisation and full potential. These conundrums often result in blanket bans and unfavourable attitudes towards inter-country adoption. Despite establishing an intricate procedural framework and prioritising the best interests of the children, the Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, 1993(‘Convention’) is not free from certain lacunae that hinder it from achieving its objectives. There is a need to improve the efficiency of the Convention so that the potential of inter-country adoption can be utilised. This paper discusses four key issues that require greater attention to achieve the same. These include the lack of special recourses in situations of crisis or national disasters, the ambiguous language leaving room for loopholes, inhibiting national legal frameworks and a lack of adherence to the Convention. The author calls for special provisions, greater accountability and beneficial interpretations for the resolution of these issues, among other suggestions.