The Rajya Sabha and the Indian judiciary share a functional link so as to maintain a constitutional equilibrium. Both their designs are oddly detailed for a reason, with no feature existing without purpose. The former is tasked with scrutinising and revising the social/moral policy initiatives of the Lok Sabha-executive combine. In parallel and with respect to the same legislative-executive actions, the judiciary has its task in reviewing recondite issues of constitutional compliance/competence. This paper elaborates upon a state of peak crisis when the two constitutional bodies abandon these behavioural responsibilities, albeit, in different ways. The core of Rajya Sabha’s revisionary powers was premised in its unique ‘representativeness’. This exclusivity, and the concomitant powers, have been wrested away from it. Resultantly, it seems to have lost its efficacy as a legislative-executive watchman. In its stead, the judiciary has taken up the additional task of filling up moral vacuities in legislative/executive actions. It is not that this probable deviation was not constitutionally accounted for by the limits on the judiciary’s writ jurisdiction. However, in an act of defiant circumvention, the judiciary has pushed the relevant theoretical/procedural boundaries to nullify that foresight. Emerging moral-judicial doctrines supply this transgression with perceived legitimacy. These parallel yet different aberrations in both the institutions constitute a state of ‘constitutional dysfunctionalism’.